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Ebola virus disease (EVD) is leaving a mark deeper 
and wider than ever before. The current outbreak now 
spans five countries in West Africa – Guinea, Liberia, 
Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone – with over 4,200 
cases and 2,200 deaths reported to the World Health 
Organization (WHO) as of 6 September 2014 (Figure 1) 
[1]. Unfortunately, with many cases either not reported 
or yet to show symptoms, the true number of infections 
is likely to be considerably higher. The first countries 
affected were among the world’s poorest, areas where 
long periods of civil wars have battered health services 
and eroded public trust. As a result, the outbreak has 
spread to other countries, and continues to expand. 
What began as a local problem has turned into an 
international crisis.
Challenges for control in Africa
Past Ebola outbreaks have never risen beyond a few 
hundred reported cases, and even these events have 
been comparatively rare. When EVD spills over from its 
animal host into human populations, it typically gen-
erates dozens rather than hundreds of infections [2]. 
Chance events in the early stages of an outbreak can 
have a large impact on its final size. Infected individu-
als’ movement patterns, social interactions, beliefs 
about disease causation and trust in authorities can 
all influence the extent of transmission, and hence 
the scale of control measures required to stop the 
infection.
In theory, Ebola is easily containable. It has a long incu-
bation period – around a week on average – and cases 
are typically infectious only after displaying symp-
toms [3,4]. This means that isolation of symptomatic 
patients, contact tracing and follow-up surveillance 
of all contacts should be sufficient to stop transmis-
sion. Contrast this with pandemic influenza, which has 
a much shorter incubation period and can generate 
numerous cases who may be asymptomatic yet infec-
tious [5]. For isolation to be effective during an Ebola 
outbreak, however, there must be rapid identification 
of cases and follow-up of contacts. Several factors can 
hinder this. In settings with limited testing facilities, 
cases that are not tested can be misdiagnosed. Not all 
EVD patients display distinctive hemorrhagic symp-
toms: the 1994 Ebola outbreak in Gabon was originally 
attributed to yellow fever [6], and early cases in the 
1995 Kikwit outbreak were mistaken for dysentery and 
typhoid fever [7].
The exponential growth in case numbers during an 
outbreak also makes resource-intensive activities like 
contact tracing and surveillance increasingly difficult. 
Recent studies, including the one by Nishiura et al. in 
this issue, suggest that the reproduction number of 
Ebola (the average number of secondary cases gener-
ated by a typical case) is between 1.5–2 in some coun-
tries [8,9]. Based on the durations of incubation and 
infectiousness of EVD [3], it is plausible that the num-
ber of cases could therefore double every fortnight if 
the situation does not change. There are currently hun-
dreds of new EVD cases reported each week; with the 
number of infections increasing exponentially, it could 
soon be thousands. Following up contacts and moni-
toring them for symptoms has already become unfea-
sible in areas where health authorities are stretched to 
the limit.
Figure 
Cumulative number of Ebola virus disease cases and 
deaths in West Africa, April to 6 September 2014 
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Disease control efforts in West Africa have been fur-
ther hampered by cases not attending healthcare 
facilities, and instead remaining in the community. 
Fear and mistrust of health authorities has contributed 
to this problem, but increasingly it is also because 
isolation centres have reached capacity. As well as 
creating potential for further transmission, large num-
bers of untreated – and therefore unreported – cases 
make it difficult to measure the true spread of infec-
tion, and hence to plan and allocate resources. Even 
if patients are isolated, however, and their close con-
tacts successfully traced, efforts can be undermined 
by unpredictable behavior. This was exemplified by the 
outbreak reported last week in Port Harcourt, Nigeria, 
which started after a contact of the index case in Lagos 
broke quarantine and left the capital [10].
Fear and mistrust are not unique to the current Ebola 
outbreak. During the 2000-1 outbreak in Uganda, 
health authorities faced similar challenges, including 
public protests, lack of co-operation from followed-
up contacts, and shortages of staff willing to work 
in Ebola isolation units [11]. To control the infection, 
authorities needed to provide leadership and build 
trust. Interventions included education in various set-
tings: in the community, educators strived to instill 
confidence, explaining how to avoid infection and rec-
ognise symptoms, while in hospitals, healthcare work-
ers were provided with additional training, support and 
protection [12].
Education can also help address cultural practices that 
fuel outbreaks. The initial chain of Ebola virus trans-
mission in Guinea in early 2014 included two funer-
als [13], and in May, another funeral introduced the 
epidemic to Sierra Leone [14]. Again, this is not just a 
feature of the present outbreak in West Africa. Funeral 
practices contributed to previous outbreaks in Central 
Africa too, but in many instances, it was possible to 
change people’s behaviour. With support from health 
educators, communities altered the way burials were 
conducted, reducing transmission [12,15].
Need for an international response
Introducing control measures requires substantial 
resources, and there is a limit to what a local response 
can achieve alone. Yet as the current outbreak has 
grown, neighboring countries have closed borders 
and introduced travel restrictions. Similar actions 
were taken during past outbreaks, such as the one in 
Uganda in 2000-1 [16]. Such restrictions can hinder 
control efforts, making it harder to bring in personnel 
and resources.
Ebola cannot be ignored in the hope it will burn itself 
out. It is true that outbreaks of acute infections will 
generally decline once a large number people have 
been infected, because there are no longer enough 
susceptible individuals to sustain transmission. But if 
Ebola indeed has a reproduction number of 2 in some 
locations as described by Nishiura et al. [8], the sus-
ceptible pool – which likely includes most individu-
als – would have to shrink by at least half before the 
outbreak declined of its own accord [17]. Given the vast 
populations in affected areas and the disease’s high 
fatality rate, this is clearly not an acceptable scenario.
Stopping transmission will instead require stronger 
control measures. On 28 August, the WHO issued a 
road map to provide a plan for the Ebola response [18]. 
It had three main objectives: (i) to achieve full cover-
age of control measures in countries with widespread 
transmission; (ii) to introduce emergency interventions 
in countries with an index case or small outbreak; and 
(iii) to strengthen Ebola preparedness in other coun-
tries, especially those connected to affected areas.
The scale of the current outbreak means an interna-
tional response is needed. The threat to Europe and 
other continents remains low – in countries with strong 
health systems, an imported case should be straight-
forward to contain [19] – but without containment the 
devastation in West Africa will continue. Much of the 
damage is now coming from knock-on effects on basic 
healthcare. Not just EVD patients are affected by the 
outbreak; in cities like the Liberian capital Monrovia, 
the presence of the infection has led to the closure of 
most health facilities. As a result, untreated injuries 
and illnesses are leading to further loss of life.
In collaboration with affected countries, the interna-
tional community must commit the resources required 
to control the outbreak. A week ago, Médecins Sans 
Frontières announced an urgent need for expertise and 
equipment [20]. As well as financial support, affected 
countries require experienced healthcare workers and 
specialists in biological disasters. The response must 
also include additional protective clothing and isola-
tion units, and diagnostic tools and laboratory testing 
facilities. Health authorities will need food for those in 
quarantine too, plus vehicles to transport patients and 
trace their contacts, and air support to move resources 
between affected areas.
The scientific community can also support control 
efforts. Mathematical modelers can help quantify 
transmission in different areas, and provide short-term 
forecasts. Researchers are also working on potential 
drugs and vaccines. On 4 and 5 September 2014, WHO 
held a meeting to discuss what treatments are cur-
rently in development [21]. Testing of these experimen-
tal therapies and vaccines will soon start and must be 
fast-tracked to establish their safety and efficacy.
The effort required to control EVD will inevitably vary 
by country. In some locations, it has been suggested 
that the reproduction number could already be near 1; 
in others it could still be as high as 2 [8]. As pointed 
out above, the size of the transmission and the repro-
duction number will be influenced by multiple fac-
tors, including the level of public trust in authorities 
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and health services, as well as behaviours and beliefs 
shaped by social and cultural traditions. Transmission 
is also likely to be setting-specific. The reproduction 
number is an average value: some individuals and 
interactions will contribute more to transmission than 
others. The infection will be easier to control if it is 
possible to identify and target these crucial links in the 
transmission chain.
Over the past 38 years, there have been more than 
twenty Ebola outbreaks, and all of them have been suc-
cessfully contained. Many of the issues currently facing 
West Africa – from lack of trust in health authorities 
to poor infection control – have surfaced before, and 
have been overcome. However, the current outbreak is 
unprecedented both in size and scale. It will require a 
response to match.
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